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ABSTRACT 
Recognition is a multi-faceted concept. In IR theory it also seems to be an undervalued concept as 
it only focuses on the relationship between states and the mutual recognition of identities as well as 
cultural and religious differences. Honneth’s concept of recognition as leading principle of social 
relations dominates the debates in political theory. Besides this focus on intersubjective agency, the 
recognition of rights and human rights also plays a role in political theory. The working paper 
focuses on this approach and argues that the emergence of certain human rights can be grasped 
through drawing on concept of recognition of rights. The paper therefore relies on the approach of 
Jens Bartelson who summarizes the debate on states’ recognition under the heading of “three 
dimensions of recognition”: the moral/social, political and legal recognition. The working paper 
draws on this conceptual clarification and relates it to the recognition of rights. It argues that the 
recognition of sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) as part of international law can be explained 
by relying on Bartelson’s concept as heuristic. The working paper traces the norm emergence 
process of SGBV from its social, political and its final legal recognition as part of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Nevertheless, the attempt of the NGO-network to 
strengthen individual women’s rights during the negotiations of the Rome Statute was opposed by 
certain states blocking a broader definition of gender-based crimes. 
1. INTRODUCTION1 
Sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) has longtime escaped sanctions in the international realm. 
This finally changed with the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court (ICC). While 
with the institutionalization of the ICC SGBV became legally recognized as punishable crimes, 
processes of social and political recognition preceded the emergence of these legal rights. 
Recognition is a multi-faceted and truly interdisciplinary concept. This paper draws on research 
undertaken in political theory, legal theory and international political sociology. The different 
disciplines focus on diverse aspects of recognition. While political theorists concentrate on 
individual or collective processes of recognition, legal theory and international political sociology 
concentrate on the recognition of states. Missing, among others, is the recognition of rights which 
at least in political theory has been reflected upon. The underlying processes of rights recognition 
are of interest for scholars of legal theory and international political sociology alike as the formal 
codification of (human) rights are preceded by processes of moral, social and political recognition. 
This article was inspired by an article of Jens Bartelson (2013) who differentiates between three 
concepts of recognition: moral/social, political and legal recognition. I further draw on Bartelson’s 
finding that the three concepts of recognition are mutually connected and help to describe how 
human rights emerge. The article reflects on existing research on recognition and argues that such 
research should reflect more consistently on the mechanisms and effects of recognition. For 
understanding the institutionalization of (human) rights, language, persuasion and argumentation 
are such mechanisms which illuminate how processes of recognition work in everyday politics 
(Bjola/Kornprobst 2011: 9). Bartelson’s insights on the recognition of states can be transferred to 
the recognition of rights. Legal recognition does not occur in isolation of other international 
1  This paper was presented at the ISA Conference 2016 in Atlanta. It derives of a larger project on “justice conflicts in 
multilateral negotations” which is funded by the German Research Association. I would like to thank Karen Aggestam, 
Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Andrea Blättler for their helpful comments. 
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practices such as moral, social and political kinds of recognition (Bartelson 2013; Agné et al. 2013: 
100). Moral/social and political recognition very often precede the formal act of legal recognition 
of a right. I argue that when concentrating on the emergence of rights, the concept of recognition 
might also serve as an analytical concept. 
While Bartelson mainly concentrates on the level of the state, other literature suggests that rights 
also need to be socially and politically recognized in order to achieve legal status (Martin 2013). 
Gould (2014) points to the fact that gross injustices or crimes need to gain empathic or solidaristic 
recognition by the international society in order to provoke political action. In the case of the 
SGBV norm, the vast occurrence of sexual and gender-based violence in the Rwandan and Balkan 
wars enabled different norm entrepreneurs to take action. For the first time, such gross violations 
of human rights were punished through the installation of ad-hoc criminal courts (International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia/ITCY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda/ITCR). 
These tribunals helped the cause of feminist lawyers who sought to get sexual and gender-based 
violence recognized as legal crimes and as gross human rights violation seriously inhibiting 
individual physical integrity and security. The process of legal recognition became essentially 
contested among states which underlines that processes of rights recognition are to a certain extent 
contingent and do not follow linear pathways. 
2. RECOGNITION: THE STATE OF THE ART 
This chapter seeks to give an overview about the different strands of recognition theory. In doing 
so, it concentrates on identifying the mechanisms and on the effects of recognition. I would like to 
start with some remarks of conceptual clarification of the concept. Ricoeur (2005) differentiates 
recognition along three different conceptual understandings. In its first basic meaning, recognition 
is about the cognititive ability to identify and distinguish something as being itself and not 
something else (25). Secondly, recognition entails a form of acknowledgement, either as self-
recognition or mutual recognition. The mechanism of mutual recognition is thirdly a path which 
allows conflicting and unequal parties to transform their relationship by means of mutual 
acknowledgement of their values and identities. As Ricoeur stresses, the practice of recognition 
“would for everyone be to receive the full assurance of his or her identity, thanks to the recognition 
by others of each person’s range of capacities” (2005: 250). 
Recognition is a multi-faceted concept and has been debated in many scientific disciplines, such as 
Internal Law, Sociology, Social Psychology, Political Theory and International Relations. When 
related to states, Kelsen (1941: 605-617) for International Law distinguishes between the formal 
legal recognition of a state and a more comprehensive practice of political recognition. In the 
latter, he refers to a government’s free decision to enter into diplomatic relationship with another 
state. International legal scholars mainly distinguish between two perspectives of recognition: 
While from the point of view of the declaratory theory the existence of states is tied to empirically 
evident, formal criteria such as a defined territory, a population and a government, proponents of 
the constitutive theory portray acts of recognition as indispensable for a political entity to obtain 
legal status as a sovereign state (Erman 2013: 132; Lauterpacht 1944). 
Viewing it from a macro-historical perspective, the international system of “civilized” states was 
formed throughout the 19th century through such practices of recognition. The 
constitutionalization of international law and the derived practices of diplomacy allowed European 
states to establish a set of shared norms and values which governed relations within the European 
states’ system. While these states formally recognized each other as “sovereign equal”, they sharply 
distinguished non-Europeans as “savages” or “barbarians” and confined them to an entirely 
different status in international law (Ringmar 2014: 5). Savages had no sovereign rights and could 
rely on the benevolence of states’ as part of a virtue of shared humanity only. Early attempts of 
recognition among states embraced a certain “standard of civilization” which served as selecting 
mechanism for the international society (Gong 1984). Today’s formal mechanism of membership 
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to the international system of states requires certain qualities of statehood, but is also based on the 
mutual and formal acknowledgment of sovereign equality among states (Bartelson 2013: 109). 
Critical law and IR studies stress that despite mechanisms of sovereign equality among states, e.g. 
in multilateral negotiations, inequality and sub-ordination are characterizing mechanisms of 
(non)-recognition among states’ and their concerted efforts to constitutionalize the international 
society. 
In IR Theory, the effects of recognition are closely tied to the status of peace and conflict among 
states. According to Ringmar, situations of mutual non-recognition between states are almost always 
unstable. Practices of recognition, therefore, might have a stabilizing effect on the international 
system of states (Ringmar 2012: 6; 2002; Lebow 2012; 2008). Moreover, it is argued that the concept 
of recognition might help to mitigate potential problems of international anarchy through a process 
of mutual recognition of different collective identities. In his piece on the processes of recognition 
between states, Honneth (2012: 35) argues that the path for civilizing international relations lies in 
sustained efforts at conveying respect and esteem for the collective identities of other states. And 
according to Lindemann (2011), recognition could become a helpful tool to mitigate conflicts in the 
international system. Recognition also has positive effects on processes of reconciliation, as the 
process of developing peaceful and cooperative relations strongly relies on symbolic values such as 
esteem and respect in order to signal to a foreign citizenry that its cultural heritage are not inferior 
and that it can count on the other’s human empathy for its suffering. 
Beyond the mechanisms of statehood and sovereign equality, IR theory has been rather limited in 
highlighting the mechanisms of recognition. Acts of such a politics of recognition between states 
might include other aspects than a legal perspective of statehood. Authors stress the relevance of 
recognizing the “Other’s” identities, status and self-esteem (Wolf 2012; Greenhill 2008). Ways of 
“thick recognition” are required to understand the “Other” in terms of essential components 
making up its identity – this also might include the respect for other’s cultural, religious or local 
differences and even the finding of some common grounds (Allan/Keller 2012: 77). Recognition of 
responsibility and empathy has been identified as important soft skills in the relationship between 
states (Lindemann 2013: 152; 2012). Bell argues that human motives such as honor, self-esteem or 
justice perceptions also serve as mechanisms of recognition. “Bearing in mind that the human 
motive of the spirit triggers the search for esteem through honor and standing, denied status will 
result in a conflict of recognition, since the party that is denied recognition will inevitably believe 
that the situation is unjust” (Bell 2014: 523). Lebow and Honneth also stress such soft skills which 
serve as mechanisms of recognition between states such as honor, status and esteem (Lebow 2012: 
93; 2008; Honneth 2012). 
Recognition in political theory 
While IR theories draw on findings of political theory and often point to Hegel as “father” of 
recognition, political theorists themselves lead a controversial debate on the meaning and 
implications of recognition. Ancient Greek philosophers, such as Aristoteles, perceived public 
recognition as a social mechanism and reward of honor. For Kant “Achtung” (esteem) became the 
highest principle of moral action. Hegel conceived recognition as the basic principle for his ethical 
thinking. From Aristotelian and Kantian versions of practical philosophy we can distinguish the 
lines of thought building on Fichte’s and Hegel’s concept of mutual recognition, in which identity 
formation, be it of individuals or of collectives, takes a central role (cf. Bedorf 2010: 10).  
On the basis of Hegel’s conception of ethical life and Mead’s social psychology, Axel Honneth 
(1994) designed his social theory of recognition. He conceives the intersubjective concept of 
recognition as the precondition for an unabated relation to self (Honneth 1994: 196; cf. Bedorf 
2010: 45–77): Reciprocal recognition allows both the involved “self” and the involved “other” to 
form their identity. It is thus the leading principle in social relations and unfolds within three 
spheres of interaction: love, law and solidarity. Therein, different mechanisms of recognition are at 
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work. In close relationships such as love relations, friendship or mother-child-relations (1), the 
involved subjects stand in need of one another and, at the same time, endorse each other mutually; 
these relations effectuate self-confidence. Relationships within the sphere of law (2) are formal and 
anonymous; as a legal subject, each individual stands in an equal relation to all other legal subjects, 
which effectuates self-respect. Within the sphere of social appreciation within a collective (3), 
lastly, an individual is recognized by the other individuals for her unique abilities and capacities, 
for her social value in the context of a shared consensus of values. Such solidarity effectuates self-
esteem. Self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem are preconditions for the very identity of 
human beings. Therefore, the harm which is caused by misrecognition or non-recognition is the 
worst form of social injustice (Kompridis 2007: 278; Zurn 2003). 
Compared to the Honneth’s theory of recognition, Charles Taylor’s multicultural account of 
recognition is more limited in that it focusses on the relation among different cultural entities only, 
building on the exemplary case of the French speaking communities in Quebec and their struggle 
to preserve their culture. Taylor (1994: 25) states that misrecognition or non-recognition inflicts 
harm, reduces the mode of being and must be perceived as a form of oppression. Due recognition 
is a vital human need. In sharp critique of “‘difference-blind’ liberalism” and its claim “that it can 
offer a neutral ground on which people of all cultures can meet and coexist” (Taylor 1994: 62) he 
demands “that we all recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them 
survive, but acknowledge their worth” (ibid: 64). Taylor draws on Frantz Fanon and his Wretched 
of the Earth to underline his claim in the context of intercultural conflicts (cf. Bedorf 2010: 27): 
“[...] recognition forges identity, particularly in its Fanonist application: dominant groups tend to 
entrench their hegemony by inculcating an image of inferiority in the subjugated. The struggle for 
freedom and equality must therefore pass through a revision of these images” (Taylor 1994: 66). 
When it comes to his conclusion, Taylor however derives from Fanon in that he is optimistic that 
successful mutual recognition would, via the mechanism of mutual acknowledgment of identity 
building self-ascriptions, effectuate authentic identities (Bedorf 2010: 33). The idea that the 
recognition of difference could alleviate “Others” from their position of oppression henceforth 
became a decisive aspect for the multi-faceted debate on recognition. 
Against the background of a feminist stance on critical theory, Nancy Fraser conceives of 
recognition not, as Honneth does, as the single main principle in social relations. She defends a 
“‘dualistic’ approach” (Lysaker/Jakobsen 2015: 6), including both economic redistribution and 
intersubjective recognition in a broader theory of justice (Fraser 2008). Recognition is thus a 
cultural phenomenon that effectuates social status: Recognition is instrumental to acquire equal 
status and parity as an interaction partner in social relations (Kompridis 2007: 278). This view 
sheds light on misrecognition: Institutional, cultural, racial or gendered forms of discrimination 
prevent people from becoming recognized as equal partners of society. While misrecognition 
surely is an infringement on the very identity of people, it is also an infringement on their human 
rights (Fraser 2003: 144).  
The recognition of (human) rights 
The recognition of rights differs from the recognition of individuals or other entities such as states. 
When it comes to the recognition of human rights, there are two strands of thinking within 
political theory. Drawing on a comparison with natural rights, the first strand positions that 
human rights may exist independently of societies and states (Lyons 2006: 2–4). Human rights are 
then understood as moral rights that exist prior to any legal or institutional rules (Feinberg 1973: 
84). Some philosophers perceive human rights as if they had an existence in moral order that can 
be identified independently of their institutionalization in international treaties or practices. From 
a natural rights perspective, human rights derive their authority from deeper order values or meta-
norms, such as fundamental moral rights possessed by all human beings or as part of the virtue of 
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humanity. Beitz (2009: 7) distances himself from such a perspective and develops a concept of 
human rights as lived practice. He stresses the difference between natural rights and human rights. 
The second school of thought emphasizes the need for recognition of rights. The English 
philosopher Thomas Hill Green (1941: 136) stresses that “rights are made by recognition” and that 
rights do not simply exist, but “thinking makes it so”. Other British Idealists such as R.C. 
Collingwood point to the relevance of the mechanism of social recognition and to the contribution 
of rights to the common good (Boucher 2011: 757; Collingwood 1992: 219). According to Jones 
(2013: 275) rights first and foremost have to be recognized by societies in order to become valid 
and legitimate. Moreover, the moral quality of such rights is essential for being perceived as rights. 
Therefore, rights are morally grounded entitlements which each member of a society ought to both 
equally enjoy and equally respect. In order for people to internalize these rights as morally 
authoritative, they must be able to understand and accept the justification of rights and their moral 
rightness. Human rights are being perceived as a subset of moral rights. Such rights might exist 
without social recognition, but from the perspective of social recognition theory, these rights are 
then only nominal or even defective (Lyons 2006: 2). According to recognition theorists, the 
existence of moral rights implies two conditions: First, the social recognition of such rights and 
secondly, the soundness of the moral principles that support their ascription. Recognition, 
therefore, becomes a constitutive act for the institutionalization of a right. Two mechanisms are so 
far highlighted as there are the moral soundness of a right and the social acknowledgment, e.g. of a 
grave injustice by people. Martin (2013: 5) takes the social recognition view of rights one step 
further by stressing the relevance of rights’ maintenance which also refers to the implementation of 
human rights beyond their mere constitution. 
For the purpose of this paper, human rights as a subset of moral rights are perceived as lived, 
dynamic processes of institutionalization that are both discursive and practical (Beitz 2009: 8).  
“The discursive community in which the practice resides is global and consists of a 
heterogeneous group of agents, including the governments of states, international 
organizations, participants in the process of international law, economic actors such as 
business firms, members of nongovernmental organizations, and participants in domestic 
and transnational political networks and social movements. [...] Human rights claims are 
supposed to be reason-giving for various kinds of political action which are open to a range 
of agents.” (Beitz 2009: 8). 
Recognition as analytical framework for the emergence of (human) rights 
Some authors have stressed that recognition is an act of communication or a speech act which 
usually takes place between two agents. Kessler/Herborth (2013: 159) argue that empirical facts 
such as rights are not simply given but the result of a “struggle for facticity”. By drawing on such 
Habermasian insights, recognition must be understood as an intersubjective concept where 
communicative practices become a decisive tool to institutionalize social order. Bartelson (2013) 
points to an additional dimension of recognition: According to him, recognition is not only a 
relational, dyadic concept, but requires a third – a triadic – relation as it takes place under the 
auspices of an audience, e.g. the public sphere. Strydom (1999: 256) identifies it as “triple 
contingency” and stresses that under current conditions of communication within societies, the 
public audience plays a crucial role. Bjola and Kornprobst argue in a similar direction by defining 
Habermas’ concept of arguing as too narrow. Argumentation is crafted as “the process through 
which its participants come to determine, by communicating with one another, whether there is a 
message – expressed in words – circulating among them that constitutes persuasive reasoning on 
how the world is like and how to act in it accordingly” (Bjola/Kornprobst 2011: 4). Persuasion then 
becomes possible because senders embed their ideas into existent knowledge or ideas of the 
recipients. Some Habermasian recipients of communicative action refer in this respect also to the 
necessity of a common lifeworld which can be broadly defined as shared repertoire of existing 
ideas that agents use to anchor their arguments. The social movement theory comes to a similar 
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conclusion when drawing on their ideas of framing (Benford/Snow 2000). Persuasion is being 
perceived as form of resonance when actors succeed to mobilize for their cause, often by drawing 
on humanitarian issues such as unreasonable suffering in violent conflicts. 
Drawing on the different dimensions of recognition – moral, social, political and legal – in order to 
describe the institutionalization and legalization of a human right shows some parallels to findings 
of norm research and communication action as they stress the contingency and contestation of 
such processes. Such an understanding of human rights comes close to older concepts of norm 
generation and more recent concepts of norm dynamics (Wunderlich 2013: 25–27). While the first 
school of thought stresses, inter alia, the relevance of norm entrepreneurs for grafting ideas into 
new norms, the second generation of norm research emphasizes the dynamics and contestation of 
norms. “Norms are born anew every day as actors instantiate them through their beliefs and 
actions” (Hoffmann 2010: 5419). Norms are being perceived as inherently ambiguous, 
indeterminate in their nature and essentially contingent. Nevertheless, both schools of thought 
would follow Kratochwil’s (1989: 69) statement according to which norms are “problem solving 
devices” which result in new standards of behavior and eventually become legally codified in 
modes of global governance or international institutions.  
The emergence of a norm on rape as individually punishable crime is perceived as a process of 
increasing institutionalization which encompasses the three different dimensions of social, 
political and legal recognition. While strands of political theory and philosophy conceptualize 
rights as being in need of social recognition, legal theorists point to the relevance of legal 
recognition as part of the legalization process. International political sociologists add the 
dimension of political recognition which becomes a decisive act among states. Bartelson (2013) 
summarizes the debate on recognition under the heading of the “three dimensions of recognition”: 
the moral/social, political and legal recognition. In the following section I draw on these findings 
and transfer them to the norm dynamics of grafting a norm on rape as individually punishable 
crime as part of the Rome Statute of the ICC.  
3. CASE STUDY: SGBV IN THE ROME STATUTE AND THE ICC 
3.1 Moral and social recognition of sexually-related crimes 
Bartelson (2013: 108) refers to moral and social recognition as mainly related to states. He 
nevertheless argues that such forms of recognition need to include epistemic recognition. The 
moral and social recognition of rights refers to the social recognition of grave injustices such as the 
deliberate targeting of civilian population in armed conflicts or forms of sexual violence as part of a 
war strategy. The social recognition of rights also includes the dissemination of knowledge about 
moral injustice into the transnational community of non-governmental organizations, social 
movements and the everyday citizen. 
From ancient times throughout the greater part of the Middle Ages, sexual violence against 
women, and in particular rape, was commonly perceived a property crime, a crime committed 
against the man who “owned” the woman, not against the women herself (Brouwer 2005: 4; 
Douglas 2001). This partly changed during the late 18th and 19th century, when the first 
institutions of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) were grafted which sought to protect 
civilians in conflicts. However, the provisions which were partly intended to protect women from 
sexual violence remained vague. 
In this context, the moral recognition of diverse forms of sexual violence as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity was finally achieved through the negotiations of the Rome Statute which brought 
about the International Criminal Court (ICC). The normative evolution has moved away from 
norms that conceive of sexual violence as violations of men’s property rights over women, to such 
norms which stress the human dignity and bodily integrity of victims (Koenig et al 2011: 4). 
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Additionally, the 1990s formed a particular “window of opportunity” for the purpose of 
humanitarian legal codification. The anti-personal mine ban treaty was concluded only six month 
earlier than the Rome Statute and similarly aimed at protecting civilians in the course of armed 
conflicts. The war horrors of Bosnia and the deliberate and vast targeting of women gained 
international attention. Women were not targeted simply because they belong to the enemies, but 
because they keep the civilian population functioning (Dixon 2002: 703). They became targets as 
part of an organized ethnic warfare which aimed at destroying the opposite population. The 
intense media coverage of crimes such as mass rapes mobilized the attention of the international 
society and paved the way for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ITCY). 
Diverse social movements, non-governmental organizations and their networks also served as 
important facilitators for the social recognition of rape as crime against humanity. Women’s 
activists managed to put the issue of women in armed conflict on the agenda of the World 
Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993 and of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women held in Beijing in 1995 (Bedont/Hall-Martinez 1999: 2). As an outcome of the Beijing 
conference, the Beijing Platform for Action committed governments to integrate a gender 
perspective within the resolution on armed conflicts. Under the Arria formular where NGOs are 
invited to address the UNSC members, women’s activists managed to gain the attention of the UN 
Security Council where violence against women in armed conflicts became recognized as a serious 
global challenge for the first UNSC Resolution 1325 of 2000. 
IR research on norm generation refers to the relevance of epistemic communities serving as 
knowledge providers and experts on the issue (Cross 2013; Adler/Haas 1992: 367). In the case of 
moral and social recognition of sexual violence as a crime against humanity, a group of feminist 
lawyers served as experts and lobbyists during the Rome negotiations. Feminist legal experts 
already played a part in the efforts to put women’s human rights on the agenda of the 1993 Vienna 
Conference and the 1995 World Conference on Women in Bejing. Through these conferences, 
feminist activists called for the international community to recognize women’s rights as human 
rights including the recognition of sexually based crimes as flagrant violations of humanitarian law 
(Copelon 2000: 219). Some of these feminist legal experts, for instance Catharine MacKinnon, 
started out in 1994 as counsel of Bosnian victims who sued the Bosnian Serb Leader Radovan 
Karadzic in the United States District Court in the case Kadic vs. Karadzic. While the Kadic 
plaintiffs are unlikely to receive any of the millions of compensation, the decisions of the US Court 
had important symbolic value and added to the moral and social recognition of deliberate bodily 
harm in intra-state armed conflicts as crimes against humanity (Dixon 2002: 706).  
While the women rights and human rights conferences of the 1990s furthered the political 
recognition of the problem of targeted sexual violence in armed conflicts, the group of feminist 
lawyers furthered the legal recognition of the problem. They did so by changing the discourse on 
sexual violence in terms of shifting it away from the old-fashioned meaning of an attack against the 
honor of men/women which is still found in parts of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as well as in 
the Additional Protocols of 1977 towards an understanding of such crimes to be perceived and 
punished as egregious human rights violations. Crucial for changing this discourse was the 
creation of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice in the ICC which was a derivative of a caucus 
present at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. The Women’s Caucus primarily 
sought to educate people worldwide about crimes against women. To this end, the Caucus 
developed membership sections in almost all countries participating in the negotiations, from all 
regions of the world, and distributed valid information about the status of negotiations to them. 
During the negotiations in Rome, the Women’s Caucus managed to diversify the issue of sexual 
violence against women and girls to recognize other forms of criminal activities beyond rape. They 
also achieved the formal recognition of sexually-related crimes against men as crimes against 
humanity on equal-footing in the Statute (Benedetti et al 2014 : 69–71). 
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3.2 The political recognition of sexually-related crimes in armed conflicts 
When Bartelson (2013: 111) points to the relevance of political recognition he also primarily refers 
to the statist realm where states willing to become part of the international system need to be 
recognized by other states. In relation to the recognition of rights, political recognition is related to 
the realm of diverse agents such as states and international organizations, for instance the United 
Nations, which recognize the issue, put it up on their agenda and initiate problem-solving action. 
The act of the political recognition of rights is the crucial link between their moral framing, their 
recognition by societal actors and their final legal codification. 
Building early steps in the course up to the political recognition of sexual violence in armed 
conflicts, the United Nations already in the 1980s addressed the issue a few times, namely in an 
ECOSOC resolution in 1984 and in a first UNGA draft resolution in 1985 on sexual violence 
against women and children introduced by Austria and Spain. Nevertheless, it was during and in 
the aftermath of the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia where the most egregious and 
targeted crimes against Bosnian women and girls had been committed by Serbian militia that the 
issue was addressed more systematically for the first time. In 1993, the UN General Assembly as 
well as the UN Security Council dedicated sessions to debating the rape and abuse of women in the 
armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, leading to the passing of respective resolutions. While 
such dedicated sessions also took place after the war crimes committed in the conflict in Rwanda 
and more recently in the conflict in Darfur/Sudan, the UN Security Council focused in more detail 
on “women, peace and security” after adopting Resolution 1325 in 2000. The consecutive UNSCR 
1820 of 2008 concentrated on the political recognition of sexual violence as war crime during 
armed conflicts. With UNSC Resolution 1888 the states of the UN Security Council in 2009 
acknowledged the continuous challenge of sexual violence against women in the context of armed 
conflicts by establishing a Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict at the Office of the 
UN Secretary General. 
Such action followed the institutionalization of the International Criminal Court and demonstrates 
the continuous relevance of taking the issue to the political sphere in order to retain states’ 
attention. The political recognition of the issue remains decisive to adequately tackle the 
continuous practice of sexual violence in armed conflicts. For getting the issue of sexually-related 
crimes on the agenda of the negotiations of the Rome Statute, the Women’s Caucus for Gender 
Justice had to convince a crucial number of states to include such crimes into the treaty text. 
Therefore, some like-minded states who were generally sympathetic to pushing human rights 
issues became decisive allies (Benedetty et al 2014: 69–71).  
3.3 The legal recognition of sexual violence in the Rome Statute 
Legal recognition concerns the codification of rights. Rights, such as human rights, might be 
essentially ambiguous and contested in their negotiation process. Nevertheless, they have to be 
perceived as core problem solving devices which set new standards of behavior and eventually 
become legally codified modes of global governance. In this respect, human rights might be 
grasped as a subset of moral rights. While legal codification is a decisive step forward in a 
comprehensive practice of recognition, the codification of legal rights has to be followed by lived, 
dynamic processes of institutionalization and implementation that are both discursive and 
practical (Beitz 2009: 8). 
The Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR) and the Yugoslavia Tribunal (ICTY) have been crucial in driving the 
evolution of jurisprudence. In particular, the tribunals have included sexual violence as constituent 
violation under the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – adding a 
momentum of further strength to the process of norm evolution. In the decision against Akayesu 
in the Rwanda Tribunal, the Trial Chamber pointed to the relationship between sexual violence 
and genocide. Moreover, the Trial Chamber managed to clearly differentiate between rape and 
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other forms of sexual violence encompassing forms of dignitary harms. In the case of rape the 
Court decided that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by showing physical force. 
Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress that prey on fear or desperation may 
constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed 
conflict. In cases of the ICTY, perpetrators were also prosecuted and convicted for rape as crimes 
against humanity which differ from war crimes in that they do not require a nexus to armed 
conflict. The Trial Chamber moreover defined rape as a violation of sexual autonomy. In the 
aftermath of the work of the two tribunals, the issue of sexual violence reached critical attention in 
international law. The normative evolution had moved away from norms that conceive of sexual 
violence as violation of men’s property rights over women to recognizing women’s human rights 
through norms which stress the human dignity and the bodily integrity of victims (Koeniget al 
2011: 14; Oosterveld 2012). In early 1993, an International Human Rights Law Group called 
Women in the Law Project (WILP) traveled to Rwanda to gather evidence through interviewing 
victims of sexual violence. They pursued a multitrack strategy by spreading the message globally to 
women’s groups but also directly targeting the ICTR. They managed to convince the Prosecutor 
Judge Goldstone to add sexual offences to the crime list prosecuted by the Tribunal (Halley 2008–
2009: 15). 
The main norms within IHL still portray sexual violence as an infringement on women’s honor. 
The ICTY statute and also the ICTR statute both recognized rape as “crimes against humanity”. 
These new rules relieved rape of its “retro dignity and honor baggage” and allowed it to become 
recognized as a freestanding crime of the same gravity as murder, extermination or enslavement 
(Halley 2009: 68). Nevertheless, feminist lawyers were not satisfied with the ways rape was being 
defined and treated in the statutes of the two war tribunals. Rape as a crime against humanity was 
only recognized if committed in the course of “armed attack”. In reality, such crimes often occur 
sporadically, which would not allow prosecuting such crimes under a narrow interpretation of this 
norm. Therefore, feminist lawyers in Rome sought to minimize the level of armed conflict needed 
to recognize rape as a crime against humanity. Moreover, as feminists strived to place rape as a 
crime at the highest level of IHL hierarchy, they also sought to avoid categorizing rape as a crime 
against humanity because such a definition implied that raping an individual human being would 
harm humanity. Instead, feminists sought to define rape as a “grave breach” that would 
individualize the wrong and allow its gendered focus to appear. This was reached through the 
intense lobbying of the Women’s Caucus on Gender Justice. Article 8.2 of the Rome Statute holds 
that the ICC includes jurisdiction to tray individuals for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, including a subsection on sexual offences (Chappell 2014: 579). 
The Rome Statute of 1998 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) also added sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization and other forms of sexual violence 
of equivalent gravity to the list of war crimes and of crimes against humanity (Ellis 2006–2007: 
235). In comparison to the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC thus codifies several other crimes against 
women besides rape. It also adds a gender component as it acknowledges that sexual violence 
could be committed against both sexes – men and women. 
Nevertheless, the attempt of the Women’s Caucus on Gender Justice to stretch definitions on 
sexual violence as legal crimes to the utmost possible triggered opposition of a number of states 
who stressed cultural or religious points of concern. A major point of contention arose from the 
question whether the term “gender” was adequate for the recognition of rights of both sexes. The 
Vatican and a number of Arab states sought to prevent the inclusion of such term as they feared 
that the such a definition would be read to encompass sexual orientation (Halley 2008–2009: 45–
46; Spees 2003: 1244). The opponents finally managed to restrict the definition of gender to 
biological sex differences and refused the recognition of the social construction of gender. Article 7 
(3) finally read as the following: 
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“For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two 
sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate 
any meaning different from the above.” 
The reference to the two sexes reflected the positions of the Arab states and the Vatican. The 
phrase “in the context of society” was intended to incorporate the social construction of gender 
and contained therefore a compromise in language. The last sentence was again sought by the 
small group of anti-gender diplomats hoping to exclude other sexual orientations (Copelon 2000: 
237). Similarly, the recognition of other sexually-related crimes such as the recognition of policies 
of sexual apartheid as pursued by the Afghan Taliban vis-a-vis women also became a contested 
issue. Due to the opposition of the US delegation, the NGO-network failed to get such crimes 
included into the definition of SGBV. Also, a potential norm on enforced pregnancy stirred the 
opposition of the Vatican and the Arab states. The Vatican sought to delete enforced pregnancy 
from the draft statute on the ground that it threatened to criminalize enforcement of national laws 
discouraging or criminalizing abortion. 
The Women’s Caucus on Gender Justice introduced new language with the term forced pregnancy 
as that term would clarify that the crime under definition is a crime committed with violent intent 
(Bedont/Hall-Martinez 1999: 74). 
Further, the recognition of women’s rights and of norms of gender equality played a crucial role in 
the institutionalization of the International Criminal Court. The ICC grants victims, and 
particularly women, a participatory role in the Court’s proceedings – it adopted the broadest 
participatory scheme of any previous tribunal. The ICC stressed that its intention is the 
empowerment of victims to seek retributive justice. Nevertheless, the ICC only has a mandate to 
address the highest level perpetrators of the most serious international crimes. Moreover, the 
culprit must be a nation that has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, or the crime must have taken 
place within the borders of such country, or the UN Security Council must have decided to refer 
the situation to the ICC (Koenig et al 2011: 18). Secondly, the criterion of complementarity must 
be fulfilled, that is, the Court only complements and does not replace national jurisdiction. 
Thirdly, the crimes must be of sufficient gravity to justify the Court’s involvement. This brief 
overview of norms against sexual violence in IHL shows that sexual violence should be outlawed 
during all phases of armed conflict. Some lawyers argue that at least rape should be recognized as 
jus cogens or as a peremptory norm (Mitchell 2005: 225; Sellers 2002: 289), which would imply 
that such a norm belongs to the top of the international legal hierarchy and takes precedence over 
national law and over other sources of international law at the international level. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Recognition is indeed a multi-faceted and interdisciplinary concept as it draws on political theory, 
legal thinking as well as on IR theory. Scholars of recognition have so far mainly concentrated on 
studying the recognition of states, social groups or individuals. The research on the recognition of 
rights, and more particular of human rights, remains underdeveloped. The paper draws on the 
three elements of recognition which Bartelson identifies, although he relates the concept of 
recognition to the statist realm. Nevertheless, the case of recognizing sexual violence in armed 
conflicts as war crimes and crimes against humanity comprises of three elements of rights’ 
recognition: Before the legal codification of several norms prosecuting SGBV as part of the Rome 
Statute was achieved, multi-layered processes of social and political recognition were decisive 
prerequisites for this success. The recognition of rights often starts with the moral and social 
recognition of a grave injustice which causes human suffering or indiscriminately affects civilians 
in armed conflicts. Such has been the case in the global governance efforts on landmines, child 
soldiers or small arms. In all of these cases, mainly humanitarian NGOs working in the field 
pointed to the unprecedented suffering of human beings and framed the issue as a case of moral 
humanitarian concern or as a human rights issue. Efforts of legalization were often motivated by 
PRIF Working Paper No. 34 
11 
 
liberal-cosmopolitan concerns of ensuring the responsibility of states to protect their citizens. As 
many of them failed to do so, such cases were taken up to the international realm and became ideal 
cases for such concerted global governance efforts. Transnational actors such as NGOs and their 
networks aimed at strengthening individual human rights beyond states’ borders. 
In the case of SGBV in armed conflicts, the process of social recognition was mainly pursued by 
women’s activists and feminist networks. While these transnational actors achieved the horizontal 
knowledge dissemination of the issue, the group of feminist lawyers took over the vertical framing 
of the problem. In order to gain political recognition, both processes of social recognition (vertical 
framing of a problem; horizontal dissemination of knowledge) have to be pursued. Moreover, 
when looking at the diverse acts of political recognition, multiple venues mainly at UN level were 
pursued by women’s activists to gain the attention of states. The political recognition of a human 
rights problem seems to be the prerequisite for the main effort of legal recognition of rights. 
The process of rights’ recognition can be essentially contested. Such has been the case in the 
processes of legal recognition of SGBV as war crimes and crimes against humanity. The effort of 
certain states to strengthen individual women’s rights was frequently countered by other states 
stressing cultural or national prerogatives such as the rights of the family. Moreover, the term 
“gender” remains a contested concept among states in multilateral negotiations. In summary, the 
practice of recognizing human rights rarely appears as a linear process. Quite the contrary, efforts 
of including SGBV in its diverse forms during the negotiations of the Rome Statute were met by 
some states’ resistance pointing to their cultural, national or sovereign prerogatives. Despite 
several normative concessions the human rights supporting states had to make, the legal 
recognition of SGBV as war crimes and crimes against humanity has been at least a nominal 
success. Martin (2013: 5) emphasized the maintenance of rights and stresses the relevance of the 
implementation process. As a next step, the implementation of the Rome Statute and the ICC 
practice regarding the prosecution of SGBV crimes should be examined in more detail in order to 
find out whether and how the recognition of rights matter in the implementation process. 
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